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FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8668
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 4925
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 2320
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 1746
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1805
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2532
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 000735

SIPDIS

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DEPT FOR EAP, EAP/MTS, EAP/MLS, EAP/EX, OFM
NSC FOR E.PHU

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PTER](#) [MASS](#) [AMGT](#) [KREC](#) [ID](#) [BM](#)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES BURMA, SECURITY ISSUES WITH
KEY GOI OFFICIAL

REF: A. STATE 36706

[1](#)B. JAKARTA 702

[1](#)C. JAKARTA 696

[1](#)D. JAKARTA 524

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4 (b+d).

[1](#)1. (C) SUMMARY: Ambassador Hume pressed key USG priorities--including Burma, counterterrorism, mil-mil cooperation and diplomatic privileges--in an April 9 meeting with Secretary General Imron Cotan, the number-two official at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DEPLU). Cotan did not commit to Indonesian support in the UN Security Council for a statement re Burma. He added that the GOI was planning to convene an informal meeting of several Asian countries (China, India, Thailand, Japan) to discuss Burma at the UN.

[1](#)2. (C) SUMMARY (Con'd): On the security side, the Ambassador expressed concern about the appearance in Indonesia of glossy Islamic extremist publications and DVD's. Cotan said the GOI would look into it. Re defense ties, Cotan noted that Indonesia supported mil-mil cooperation. That said, U.S. military training for the Indonesian police was problematic and the GOI preferred that such training to be done on a police-police basis. He promised to address the issue of diplomatic privileges. END SUMMARY.

BURMA

[1](#)3. (C) Ambassador Hume urged Indonesia to support a UNSC Presidential Statement (PRST) on Burma (Ref A). He noted that the Burmese regime refuses to cooperate with UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari and ignores international demands for genuine reforms. Gambari said that a PRST would be helpful supporting his mission; countries that supported the UN effort like Indonesia should therefore support the PRST, the Ambassador argued. He also reminded Cotan that FM Wirajuda told A/S Hill last week that Indonesia would try to work toward a consensus on this matter.

[1](#)4. (C) Cotan responded that while Indonesia supported Gambari's mission, it was not yet convinced that a UNSC PRST was appropriate at this point. He also explained that Indonesia was planning to convene an informal meeting of regional states at the UN to discuss ways to support

Gambari's mission. FM Wirajuda has instructed PermRep Natalegawa to organize the meeting, and he has already approached China, India, Japan and Thailand about participating.

COUNTERTERRORISM

¶5. (C) The Ambassador told Cotan that we are concerned about the appearance of professionally produced and seemingly well-funded jihadi publications and videos in the Indonesian market (Ref D). The Ambassador also pointed to recent statements by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir that seemed to threaten foreign tourists in Indonesia. Indonesia has made significant progress against Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other terrorist organizations. Developments such as these ran counter to that generally positive CT trend, the Ambassador asserted. (Note: Separately, the Russian Ambassador had raised the publications issue with us--and DEPLU--because several of the publications contained stories supporting Chechen extremists. The Australian DCM also told us that the GOA was concerned about Ba'asyir's latest comments.)

¶6. (C) Cotan was surprised by the quality of the jihadi publications and videos and promised to look into the matter. He reaffirmed Indonesia's commitment to fighting terrorism and to cooperating with the United States on this issue. (Note: Cotan also raised the matter of detained JI terrorist operative Hambali--see septel.)

MILITARY TIES

¶7. (C) Turning to defense ties, the Ambassador explained that the United States was committed to reestablishing a

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fully normalized relationship with the Indonesian military (TNI). The recent cancellation of planned training for Indonesian Army Special Forces (KOPASSUS) was a temporary setback, the Ambassador said; we would find a way to move forward. He noted, however, that the USG remained concerned about accountability for past human rights violations by the military. In that regard, the recent release of convicted Timor Leste militia leader Eurico Guterres (Ref B), and the sentence handed down for a peaceful flag raising in Maluku (Ref C), did not help convince skeptics that Indonesia had made progress on human rights.

¶8. (C) Cotan assured the Ambassador that the Indonesian government remained focused on human rights. He asserted that that the Guterres and Maluku cases were results of judicial processes that the government could not control.

¶9. (C) On his own volition, SecGen Cotan also affirmed that the Indonesian Government was committed to strong mil-mil ties with the United States. He noted, however, that the Indonesian National Police (INP) have responsibility for counterterrorism activities in Indonesia. As a result, INP cannot receive counterterrorism or other training from the U.S. military. According to Cotan, the GOI had decided that mil-mil and police-police cooperation were acceptable while mil-police cooperation was not. (Note: Cotan explained that senior GOI officials had recently met to clarify this policy. Septel reviews this issue.)

¶10. (C) Cotan also explained that some in the military pointed to what they believed were continued USG restrictions on military sales and training as evidence of a lack of U.S. commitment to mil-mil ties. According to Cotan, DEPLU and other GOI agencies continued "to educate" Indonesian officials on this issue.

SHIPMENTS AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES

¶11. (SBU) The Ambassador pressed Cotan for progress on problems affecting shipments and other diplomatic privileges. He explained that shipments of both personal and official

vehicles and other property have been delayed, sometimes by several months. This situation caused the Embassy to pay significant storage and costs and hurt both Mission operations and staff morale. Ambassador Hume also noted that some DEPLU employees have requested "gifts" before performing important tasks, such as processing diplomatic ID cards.

¶12. (SBU) Cotan said he was aware of the problem and DEPLU was taking steps to address it. He had already reprimanded several DEPLU employees in connection with these problems. Further, the Foreign Minister has approved the dismissal or reassignment of other DEPLU employees, although no action has yet been taken toward this end. Cotan gave no indication of a time-line for improving the situation.

HUME